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Summary box
A process analysis of response to decentralisation 
in Pakistan and its consequences on health systems 
comes up with five main findings:
 ► Devolution led to increased government health al-
locations, sector-wide planning and governance 
innovations.
 ► Enthusiasm and ownership within subnational politi-
cal–bureaucratic circles provided support.
 ► Weak national coordination capacity at centre and 
insufficient stewardship capacity in provinces im-
peded progress.
 ► Health systems became more vulnerable to local 
political interference requiring active management.
 ► Decentralisation implementation requires con-
tinued centre-province discussion on unresolved 
boundaries.
AbSTrACT
Decentralisation is widely practised but its scrutiny tends 
to focus on structural and authority changes or outcomes. 
Politics and process of devolution implementation 
needs to be better understood to evaluate how national 
governments use the enhanced decision space for bringing 
improvements in the health system and the underlying 
challenges faced. We use the example of Pakistan’s 
radical, politically driven provincial devolution to analyse 
how national structures use decentralisation opportunities 
for improved health planning, spending and carrying out 
transformations to the health system. Our narrative draws 
on secondary data sources from the PRIMASYS study, 
supplemented with policy roundtable notes from Pakistan.
Our analysis shows that in decentralised Pakistan, health 
became prioritised for increased government resources 
and achieved good budgetary use, major strides were 
made contextualised sector-wide health planning and 
legislations, and a proliferation seen in governance 
measures to improve and regulate healthcare delivery. 
Despite a disadvantaged and abrupt start to devolution, 
high ownership by politicians and bureaucracy in provincial 
governments led to resourcing, planning and innovations. 
However, effective translation remained impeded by weak 
institutional capacity, feeble federal–provincial coordination 
and vulnerability to interference by local elites.
Building on this illustrative example, we propose (1) 
political management of decentralisation for effective 
national coordination, sustaining stable leadership and 
protecting from political interfere by local elites; (2) 
investment in stewardship capacity in the devolved 
structures as well as the central ministry to deliver on new 
roles.
InTroduCTIon
Decentralisation, in its various forms, is widely 
practised across low-income and middle-in-
come countries (LMICs), including Kenya, 
Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia in Africa, 
Brazil, Peru and Mexico in Latin America, 
and Nepal, Indonesia and China in Asia.1 
Technical arguments for decentralisation 
include local accountability, participatory 
governance, improved responsiveness and 
managerial efficiency.2 Administratively, 
decentralisation can be expressed in milder 
forms of delegating authority to a lower 
organisational level, in more advanced forms 
involving the transfer of authority to a lower 
or parallel administrative level, or devolution 
which is the total divesture of responsibility at 
the centre and its assumption by a lower tier.3
Scrutiny of decentralisation has predomi-
nantly focused on structural changes, extent 
of decision space provided or performance 
in terms of better equity, efficiency and 
accountability.3–5 We contend that decentral-
isation assessments are incomplete unless 
the process and politics of decentralisation is 
also examined. This is an important and rele-
vant dimension as decentralisation is often 
brought in as part of a radical political change 
with demands for redistribution in resources, 
responsibilities and accountabilities,6–9 and 
performance is often unpredictable, mixed 
and dependent on the context in which 
decentralisation is implemented.10
In this paper, we present an analysis of 
improvements to health systems in Pakistan, 
in response to a politically driven devolution 
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box 1 data sources: our narrative drew on the following 
secondary data sources:
 ► Desk review conducted for PRIMASYS that included the National 
Finance Commission Award, post-devolution concurrent legislative 
list for health, provincial situation analysis reports, provincial health 
sector strategies, budgetary review of reconciled expenditure 
2009/2010−2013/2014, provincial reform acts and legislations, 
organograms of national and provincial ministries, new PC-1s, im-
portant notifications, National Health Accounts, national health sur-
veys, WHO mission reports, independent assessment reports.
 ► Analysis from 26 key informant interviews conducted during 
PRIMASYS: conducted to identify and explore two reform path-
ways—an initiative that progressed well and another that got hin-
dered. Key informants were those who had been part of the post 
devolution initiative.
 ► Minutes of six national policy roundtables conducted for devel-
opment of National Health Vision: 25–40 participants per round-
table, included representatives of national and provincial health 
ministries, NGOs, technical assistance agencies, experts, interna-
tional development partners, private industry, medical and nursing 
associations.
process. Devolution represents the most radical form of 
decentralisation. In 2010, Pakistan dissolved 17 federal 
ministries devolving legislative, operational and financial 
responsibilities to its four provinces.11 The devolution 
was undertaken through a major constitutional amend-
ment unanimously supported by all political parties to 
meet the long-standing provincial demands for a lead 
role in shaping and implementing policies, a more equi-
table financial share and more locally responsive solu-
tions particularly in the social sector.
The analysis aims to better understand and evaluate 
how subnational structures use decentralisation opportu-
nities for improved planning, spending and carrying out 
transformations to the health system. Our narrative first 
landscapes the radical change in subnational authority 
and the process of abrupt devolution and subsequent 
partial recentralisation. Next, we analyse progress towards 
meeting devolution objectives in three areas: (1) did 
increased provincial resources translate into increased 
government expenditure for health?; (2) did enhanced 
provincial policy role lead to improvements in the 
health planning process?; (3) what progress was made in 
reform for health systems? Based on the above, we draw 
implications on how subnational governments used the 
enhanced decision space and influence of ownership, 
capacity, coordination and leadership factors.
The paper draw on findings from the Primary Care 
Systems Profile and Performance (PRIMASYS) Pakistan 
study conducted in 2016 by the authors. PRIMASYS 
probed structural aspects and processes of recent Primary 
Health Care planning, reforms and innovations.12 Addi-
tionally, minutes of national consultative policy round 
tables conducted for developing Pakistan’s National 
Health Vision 2016–2513 were analysed to identify success 
and barriers to post devolution health systems responses. 
This was supplemented with updates and insights from 
the authors (box 1).
devoluTIon: exTenSIve AuTHorITy, AbrupT proCeSS And 
pArTIAl reCenTrAlISATIon
Pakistan population of 207 million14 is spread over four 
provinces—Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Baluchistan—and a small portion resides in federally 
controlled territories. Each province is geographically 
diverse, has a distinctive culture, regional language and 
distinct political following. Health has constitutionally 
been the provincial government’s responsibility; however, 
the presence of a concurrent legislative list allowed the 
fluid sharing of powers between the federal and provincial 
government.15 In practice, the federal ministry took lead 
in health planning, service delivery programming and 
monitoring, aid coordination, human resource and drug 
licensing and regulations. Over time, it also expanded 
into funding and management of the larger health 
hospitals.16 Provincial governments, while being a major 
co-financer of health, mainly had a passive role confined 
to administration of health facilities and programmes. 
Devolution was preceded by a radical change in federal–
provincial resource distribution formula of 2009 with 
majority share (56%–58%) going to provinces.17 It is also 
an equity-based formula for distribution of resources to 
the less populated provinces by factoring in development 
needs and security challenges.18
Process of transitioning of power from federal to 
provincial government was abrupt. The 2010 devolution 
abolished the ‘concurrent legislative list’ and replaced 
it with an exclusive shorter list of federal powers and 
a longer list of exclusive provincial powers. The func-
tions of health planning, legislation, service regulation, 
financing service delivery, human resource production 
and service delivery programming were devolved to the 
provinces (table 1). During the 14 months between devo-
lution being promulgated into law (April 2010) to abol-
ishment of the Ministry of Health (MoH) (June 2011), 
there was scant discussion and planning undertaken by 
the federal ministry with provinces. Hence, provinces 
were overnight confronted with additional responsibili-
ties with resourcing and planning yet to be worked out.
The provincial governments were not prepared for post 
devolution (budgetary) scenario. Only one workshop was 
conducted whereby future of National Institute of Health 
(NIH) Islamabad was discussed in light of devolution, but 
federal managed tertiary institutes were not discussed. As a 
result we had a fiasco at JPMC (Jinnah Postgraduate Medi-
cal Centre) and the matter went into litigation. (provincial 
health ministry)
The federal powers retained were dispersed across 
the remaining federal institutions such as the Planning 
Commission, Federal Bureau of Statistics19 and a newly 
set up Inter-Provincial Ministry. This posed issues in 
national coordination for global health commitments, 
drugs licensing, and regulation of medical and nursing 
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Table 1 Distribution of federal–provincial roles and authority
Functions Federal Provincial
Health planning International agreements and targets Policies, strategies, plans, legislations





Human resource Licensing HR production HR planning, deployment, management
Service delivery Oversight on international agreements Services menu, programming, implementation







Governance Standard setting Strategic purchasing, regulation, accountability
Source: Federal Legislative List Parts I and II.
professions. A multidonor WHO mission in 2012 recom-
mended that dispersed federal powers be assembled into 
the Inter-Provincial Ministry for coherence.20 However, 
health functions were hurriedly reassembled into a sepa-
rate federal ministry in 2013 during tenure of a caretaker 
government through a direct executive order, amal-
gamating a National Regualtions Ministry established in 
2012 into the Ministry of National Health Services Regu-
lation and Coordination (MoNHSRC). It has struggled 
to recover legitimacy as its existence is contested both 
by provinces as well as the federal entities to which its 
functions had originally been passed on. Post devolution, 
at least eight new federal ministries have been created 
without going through parliamentary approval process.21 
Hence, the process of recentralisation started in the early 
years of devolution, but the remits of new central struc-
tures remains vague and unsettled.
GovernmenT SpendInG on HeAlTH
Health spending post devolution depends largely on 
provincial contributions. A single line budgetary transfer 
is made to the provinces from the central tax revenue 
pool and then proportionate allocation to health and 
sectors by provinces in line respective provincial priori-
ties. Provinces reacted to devolution through a steady and 
tangible increase in proportionate spending on health. 
Increased budget allocation for health is seen in all prov-
inces ranging from 50% to threefold. Provincial contri-
bution to the country’s government health expenditure 
has risen from 72% in 2009/10% to 82% in 2013/2014. 
There is also a visible rise in per capita health allocations 
by provincial governments (table 2). Increased provin-
cial spending has also contributed to a faster growth 
of national consolidated government health expendi-
ture in the country compared with the country’s overall 
health expenditure.22 Provincial budget execution rates 
have remained over 75% despite a sharp increase in 
health allocations.22 Strong ownership has been seen by 
the provincial political legislature in approving health 
budgets, constitution of provincial standing committees 
on health and prioritisation of health by chief ministers 
of all provinces.
At the same time, there has been fiscal stress due to 
insufficient and delayed fiscal transfers from the health 
portion of federal budget that was committed pre-devo-
lution. Federal health transfers comprise an important 
chunk of funding to financed vertical programmes, the 
extensive Lady Health Workers Program and tertiary 
hospitals under federal management. Insufficient federal 
fiscal transfers have precipitated doctors’ strikes at leading 
tertiary hospitals, protests by community health workers 
and stock out of supplies of vertical programmes.23 24 The 
gap has been partially adjusted by provinces through 
either own resources or international donor support.
Despite increased allocations, salaries continue to 
consume the major portion of the provincial health 
budgets and the share has even risen in some prov-
inces (table 2). There is a policy push for recruitment 
of doctors and specialists rather than less costly front-
line health workers. There is also a demand by provin-
cial legislators for jobs provision to their constituents in 
government services.
STewArdSHIp And plAnnInG
In Pakistan, sector-wide planning was initiated for the 
first time after provincial devolution. Health policies 
were few and far between—only four health polices had 
been formulated in Pakistan’s 64-year history prior to 
devolution—these were mainly disease oriented, focused 
on the government sector delivery and not translated 
into operational planning.16 Planning had traditionally 
followed a project mode, shaped by specific government 
or donor-funded projects and vertical programmes. 
Project formulation was largely federally driven and had 
a rigidly tailored design across all provinces. Post devolu-
tion, provinces were confronted with a vacuum of sector-
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Table 2 Health allocation and expenditure by provincial governments
BE 2009/2010 BE 2010/2011 BE 2011/2012 BE 2012/2013 BE 2013/2014
Provincial per capita allocation on health (US$) 
  Punjab 7.5 9.1 8.6 9.6 10.4
  Sindh 7.0 7.9 8.8 10.9 12.9
  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 4.1 6.0 5.9 7.8 8.7
  Baluchistan 6.2 9.0 11.3 11.9 15.6
Provincial health budget spending by salary vs non-salary (%)
  Punjab
  Salary 43% 48% 53% 57% 58%
   Non-salary 57% 52% 47% 43% 42%
  Sindh
   Salary 56% 58% 56% 55% 56%
   Non-salary 44% 42% 44% 45% 44%
  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
   Salary 60% 68% 72% 68% 63%
   Non-salary 40% 32% 28% 32% 37%
  Baluchistan
   Salary 80% 66% 70% 73% 73%
   Non-salary 20% 34% 30% 27% 27%
Source: consolidated annual health budgets of provincial finance departments; consolidated health expenditure from public 
accounts data 2009–2014; provincial population growth rates from National Census 2016–2017.
The devolution was thrown to the provinces with a single 
stroke of the pen; the provinces had neither the capaci-
ty nor were administratively ready to take this up. That is 
when we decided to develop provincial health sector strat-
egy. (provincial health ministry)
Over the first 2 years of devolution, the provinces came 
up with province-specific Health Sector Strategies laying 
out a 10-year strategic direction across public and private 
health sectors. These were assisted by bilateral aid agen-
cies and the World Bank, with donors viewing this as an 
opportune window to engage with provinces. In two of 
the provinces—Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—the 
planning process moved forward to the district level with 
the development of District Health Plans. Roadmaps are 
in place in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to improve 
public service delivery using defined targets, regular 
stock-takes and investment in data. A significant increase 
in legislative activities has been seen across all four prov-
inces. Legislations have for the first time been directed 
towards important health reform areas of Public Private 
Partnerships, Health Services Regulation and Autonomy 
of Teaching Hospitals. Certain level of restructuring of 
provincial Health Departments has also taken place to 
steer health stewardship. At least two provinces have 
established policy or reforms units, and one province 
has further restructured the health ministry to create a 
new department for primary and secondary care so as to 
ring fence administrative attention and resourcing for 
primary care (table 3).
However, health sector strategies, plans and legisla-
tions formulated remain unevenly implemented and 
only partially adjusted within health budgets.19 There are 
frequent instances of ad hoc initiatives for hospital infra-
structure schemes, tertiary specialists units and medical 
colleges, popular with political leaderships and providing 
visibility for electorates. Capability is weak to build link-
ages between reform, planning and budgeting. Tech-
nical assistance for reforms provided by donors remains 
clustered in the better-performing resourced provinces 
of Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, with less in Sindh 
and none in Baluchistan, hence further exacerbating 
inequities in terms of capability in terms of responding 
to devolution.
GovernAnCe InnovATIonS for ImprovInG prImAry 
HeAlTHCAre
Post devolution, governance reforms to improve primary 
care service delivery have been attempted in all provinces 
but with varying success. We bring here two contrasting 
pathways taken to improve primary care delivery—
the first example of private sector harnessing through 
contracting and regulation is an example that fared 
better whereas the second example of attempt towards 
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integrating preventive healthcare delivery highlights 
failed resilience (table 3).
private sector harnessing
Pakistan has a mixed health system for primary care 
comprising a large network of government health facili-
ties, private individual practitioners, philanthropic organ-
isations and private medical entities. Government health 
facilities especially in rural areas have had low use, poor 
maintenance and poor quality of care.25 Post devolu-
tion, there are noticeable attempts to harness the private 
sector through regulation and purchasing of services.
Post devolution, government regulation of private 
providers is underway to reduce high levels of quackery 
and has been introduced in three provinces. There has 
also been a noticeable appetite among provinces to learn 
on private sector experiences from each other. Regula-
tory Health Commissions established in one province 
to regulate health services have been replicated in two 
other provinces. Licensing of facilities is well underway; 
however, the more ambitious quality assurance func-
tion lacks capacity. Legislative cover has been provided 
through the Public Private Partnerships and Health 
Services Regulation passed by the provincial assem-
blies.26 27 Another initiative to tighten market pharmacies 
and drug outlets is underway in one province, assisted 
by an expanded drug inspector workforce and computer-
ised tagging of pharmacies.
Purchasing of private sector services has also gained 
policy foothold post devolution. The over-riding intent 
by provincial governments remains on improving the 
functionality of government health services through 
using private professionalised providers. Contracting 
the management of Basic Health Units (BHUs) NGO 
was first initiated in mid-2000s across all provinces by 
a federally led initiative,28 29 but based on single source 
contract. Post devolution, there has been (1) an expan-
sion and diversification in number of private suppliers 
that include private hospital, development charities and 
private commercial firms; (2) expansion from BHU to 
contracting for rural health centres, district hospitals, 
referral hospitals and so on; (3) expansion from clinical 
to support services such as transportation of supplies, 
equipment maintenance and repairs, ambulance 
services and so on30 (table 3). Separate public–private 
partnership (PPP) units for contracting have been set 
up in the provincial health ministries of the two prov-
inces for managing and monitoring PPPs, but there 
are serious capacity gaps in managing the contracting 
process to bring in qualified providers, link budgetary 
disbursements with outputs, and effectively monitor 
contracts.31
Provincial planners and implementers like to learn from 
each other and even compete in performing in certain 
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Integrating vertical healthcare programs
Pakistan has a long history of implementing vertical 
preventive health programmes, programmed by the 
federal ministry and co-financed by both federal and 
provincial ministries. At the time of devolution, there 
were 10 vertical programmes that include Expanded 
Program of Immunization, Roll Back Malaria, TB-DOTs, 
HIV AIDS Control, TB-DOTs, Maternal Newborn and 
Child Health, Nutrition Support Program, Blindness 
Control, Avian Flu, and Hepatitis B and C Control. Vertical 
programmes while providing the benefit of focused over-
sight have created fragmented service delivery, duplica-
tion of resources and delayed financial releases because 
of centralised budgets.32–35 Although vertical projects 
are required to be integrated into regular budgets and 
district staffing after a period of 4–5 years, some vertical 
programmes have been running for more than 30 years.
Post devolution, the declining federal support and 
challenge of expanding coverage to under-covered areas 
compelled provinces to re-look vertical programmes. 
Vertical programme integration was prioritised under 
provincial health sector strategies and costed Essential 
Health Service Delivery Packages were developed with 
donor technical assistance (table 3).36–38 One province 
moved ahead combining four overlapping programmes 
into a single integrated health project39 while another 
functionally integrated the 10 preventive programmes 
into three major programmes. Despite these begin-
nings, vertical programmes have largely continued in 
parallel. One of the blocks has been the continuation 
of federal funding line for vertical programmes and 
hampers creation of integrated budgeting. A fresh cycle 
of vertical projects has been started by the new federal 
health ministry and posts of federal vertical programme 
directors have been revived, hence re-establishing federal 
verticalised authority over preventive care. Constraints 
for integration are also seen in the provinces. Vertical 
programme integration is actively resisted by provincial 
vertical programme managers, who often enjoy backing 
from provincial legislatures—this has moved integration 
from a high-priority agenda to a de-prioritised agenda.
Behind every vertical program is a politician. How can 
change be brought in such a context? (vertical programme 
manager)
leadership support, capacity and federal–provincial 
coordination
Proliferation in health systems initiatives post devolution 
has been driven by strong support by provincial govern-
ments and the civil bureaucracy. At the same time, key 
factors need to be understood that have constrained 
effective translation.
The provinces had a disadvantaged start in terms of 
technical capability as the past context of federally domi-
nated political, fiscal, administrative power stunted the 
maturity of provincial administrative structures. Strong 
political support for devolution and visible ownership of 
health in all four provinces led to increased resourcing 
of health from government budget, push for provincial 
planning and monitoring, as well as support for regu-
lation, contracting and other governance initiatives to 
circumvent slow-moving government systems to deliver 
results. At the same time, the loosening of federal verti-
cality made the provinces vulnerable to interference by 
provincial political elites. Political pressure for visible 
health infrastructure projects, specialty schemes, recruit-
ment of local constituents and instances of favoured 
appointments was seen in all provinces, often derailing 
health sector strategies. Provinces where health minis-
tries had strong executive backing were better able to 
withstand political pressures than those that were not 
closely aligned to provincial leadership. Trained human 
resource and lack of support systems has blunted prog-
ress of sector strategies despite an appetite for health 
reforms. Frequent change in health secretaries in 
all provinces further interrupted the momentum of 
progress.
In Provinces A&B __ there is clear divide in (provincial) 
government on ethnic grounds. This has resulted in di-
vided bureaucracy and (politically) always a coalition gov-
ernment with ministers maneuvering their own chosen 
Secretaries and other staff in clear violation of merit and 
seniority. This results in a kind of institutional and gover-
nance break down. (provincial planning and development 
department)
Frequent transfer and postings at senior management lev-
el especially of Secretary of Health results in coordination 
gaps to address health issues and also a lack of interest at 
all levels. (development partner).
Weak federal–provincial coordination is also respon-
sible for slowing transformative change. Transition of 
devolutionary powers was abrupt taking place without 
planning discussions between the federal ministry with 
provincial counterparts. As a result, there continue to be 
unresolved resourcing and administrative issues, dodging 
the federal–provincial relationship over the past 7 years. 
Federal dialogue with provinces has remained ad hoc 
post devolution and is usually precipitated by crisis such 
as polio outbreaks or vertical initiatives championed by 
MoNHSRC. As yet, there has been a lack of national lead-
ership to address outstanding federal–provincial issues, 
coordinate on a common national direction and allow 
lessons sharing across provinces.
The federal ministry also has capacity issues—it has 
been re-populated with former staff experienced in 
vertical programme management, but lacks expertise 
for its new role of coordination and regulation across 
the diverse provinces.19 Technical assistance provision to 
the federal health ministry has been overlooked by inter-
national donors and placed solely to the sources. Above 
all, the ministry lacks federal political clout, perceived in 
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ConCluSIon
We assessed Pakistan’s 2010 provincial health devolu-
tion against devolution’s intended outcomes of better 
resourcing, improved planning and local contextual 
innovations. By focusing on the critically less understood 
area of processes and politics, we explored why certain 
initiatives progressed better and other did not, so as to 
better manage decentralisation experiences. Our analysis 
did not assess performance outcomes and its attribution 
to specific health reforms post devolution.
In decentralised Pakistan, health became prioritised 
for increased government resources and achieved good 
budgetary use. However, allocation priorities were not 
effectively adjusted and there was little effort at targeting 
of inequities. Major strides were made in terms of provin-
cially contextualised sector-wide health planning and 
legislations, but implementation has been weakly steered. 
There has also been a feverish proliferation in gover-
nance measures to improve, professionalise and regulate 
healthcare delivery. Some have had wide roll-out, others 
have been only partially implemented and at times, even 
aborted.
Global findings show that political decentralisation 
is associated with higher health expenditures and even 
higher in case of both political and fiscal decentralisa-
tion.40–43 Latin American countries’ experience shows 
decentralised governments were successful in mobil-
ising additional household sources,8 44 which we did 
not see in the case of Pakistan. Decentralisation experi-
ences in Kenya,45 46 Nigeria47 and Mexico48 report weak 
mechanisms for resource management in subnational 
governments. There is scant evidence from developing 
economies on post devolution planning and governance; 
however, literature from Sweden and UK supports the 
case of improved regional planning and innovations post 
decentralisation.
Our analysis shows that high political-bureaucratic 
ownership of health facilitated progress but weak stew-
ardship skills and frequent leadership changes at subna-
tional level, vulnerability to interference by local elites 
and feeble national coordination constrained effective 
implementation. The federal–provincial relationship 
post devolution remained troublesome having a disad-
vantaged start with abrupt transitioning, unresolved 
resource sharing issues and ad hoc vertically led dialogue. 
There is scant literature on politics of health decentrali-
sation in LMICs. Chaotic interprovincial coordination is 
reported from West and Central African states, where the 
central government resisted relinquishing resources and 
attempted to re-empower the central government.44 49–53 
LAC experience analysed by Bossert et al highlights 
the value of incentives to make subnational structures 
perform which was missing in Pakistan’s decentralisation 
design government.
We contend that examination of decentralisation 
should be expanded to include process assessments to 
detect challenges and help manage responses. We propose 
a few recommendations. First, investment for technical 
capability development in devolved structures is required 
early on as most decentralisation experiences in LMICs, 
driven by sweeping political process, will not provide 
time for a learning-by-doing incrementalist approach 
seen in technical driven experiments with decentralisa-
tion in OECD countries. Second, technical support for 
the central level to shift to a new modus operandi should 
not be over-looked as part of capacity building efforts. 
Third, measures are needed for political management of 
decentralisation to safeguard against local political pres-
sures, leadership stability, and continued centre-prov-
ince discussion on issue interpretation and consensus 
building.
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